A. S. Bhasin's book, "Nehru, Tibet and China," published in 2021, offers a detailed look at the complex relationship between India, Tibet, and China during a crucial historical period, with a particular focus on India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. The book, published by Penguin Books, covers events leading up to and including the 1962 conflict between India and China. Drawing heavily on extensive archival research, including material from the Nehru collection and the author's own five-volume study of India-China relations, Bhasin aims to provide a "factual history" of these turbulent days.
The author, A. S. Bhasin, has had a long and productive career focused on documenting India's foreign relations. He is known for meticulous collating and publishing original archival documents. His prior work includes a five-volume study titled "India–China Relations, 1947–2000: A Documentary Study," which compiled 2523 documents over 5320 pages, many of them highly classified. This current book is described as being more "forthright, direct and unsparing" than his previous documentary collections. Bhasin states in the preface that his instinct as a student of history compelled him to undertake this study to put forward the factual history emerging from these documents before the Indian people. He sees historiography as the "science of rereading the past, reinterpreting it and revising the narrative," a challenge to history that keeps it "alive and kicking" as new evidence emerges. He emphasizes that this book is a work of history and should be read as such, noting that history traces the footprints of people who influence events. Bhasin received guidance and valuable suggestions from several former ambassadors and experts in foreign relations, including Shivshankar Menon, Kishan Rana, Vijay K. Nambiar, C.V. Ranganathan, and Chinmoy Garekhan, highlighting the rigorous review process the book underwent. He also acknowledges the significant help from the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library and other institutions in accessing the archival material.
The book's table of contents provides a clear roadmap of the historical narrative Bhasin explores. It begins with a historical perspective on India, Tibet, and China, before moving into the period of the fall of Kuomintang China and the rise of Communist China. Subsequent chapters delve specifically into India's relations with Communist China, the complex issue of Tibet, the Chinese occupation of Tibet, and key agreements like the 17-Point Agreement and the India-China Agreement on Tibet. Significant events such as the Revolt in Tibet, the Dalai Lama's flight to India, the border frontier issues, the Nehru-Zhou Summit in April 1960, and the lead-up to the 1962 war and its aftermath are covered in dedicated chapters. The structure indicates a chronological and thematic approach, focusing on how these elements shaped India's foreign policy and its relationship with China during Nehru's leadership.
The praise for the book highlights its importance and contribution. Shivshankar Menon, former ambassador and National Security Adviser, calls it a "must-read" for anyone interested in India's foreign policy and China, describing it as a "significant contribution to the ongoing debate" on China, especially relevant given the current state of India-China relations. Srinath Raghavan, author of "The Most Dangerous Place," notes that Bhasin's work has been invaluable for scholars and describes the book as "scrupulously researched and calmly argued". Vijay Gokhale, another former ambassador to China and foreign secretary, highlights the book's analysis of the India-China relationship, "especially in the context of Tibet," and suggests it allows "ordinary people to grasp the facts," calling it a must-read for understanding a potentially critical diplomatic challenge of the century. Vijay Nambiar, former ambassador and special adviser, finds the volume "more forthright, direct and unsparing" and notes that the narrative is dominated by Nehru's "fatal attraction" for China, describing the historic engagements as initially "visionary and trusting," then "ambivalent and ultimately tragic". This advance praise establishes the book as a serious, well-researched analysis of a crucial historical period, offering new insights and challenging existing narratives.
One of the key themes Bhasin addresses is the contrast between the rising People's Republic of China and the newly independent India under Nehru. Mao Zedong's declaration at the inauguration of the PRC, "We shall emerge in the world as a nation with an advanced culture. And one with power," set an agenda for China to become a dominant power. Bhasin argues that while Nehru was willing to share the "glory of Asia" with China, he was not willing to "abdicate in its favour," and this tension is what the book attempts to capture. The sources suggest that India's initial approach to Communist China was "meek and docile," ignoring warnings and continuing a single-minded pursuit of friendly relations until it was too late. This is described as a "devastatingly clear" contrast with China's approach to India.
The historical relationship between India and China is touched upon, noting Nehru's early "love of China" and the Indian people's commitment to the Chinese cause, partly influenced by Nehru. The Indian National Congress had maintained relations with the Kuomintang but also sympathized with the sacrifices of the communist leaders fighting against Japanese aggression. The Congress even sent a medical unit to help the communist armies. However, despite India's sympathy and efforts, the communist Chinese leaders did not fully acknowledge past contacts, particularly Nehru's personal sympathy and association with the Kuomintang, though they did remember figures like Tagore and Dr. Dwarkanath Kotnis. Nehru himself had wished to visit the communist areas during his 1939 visit to China but was unable to due to the war.
The "Tibet Conundrum" is central to the book. Historically, Tibet was under China's sovereignty or suzerainty for about two hundred years, with the degree of control fluctuating. The British position, which India inherited, generally recognized Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty. India's security on its north-eastern frontier was tied to Tibet's status. When China threatened to "liberate" Tibet, India faced a dilemma. The British had previously assured Lhasa they would not agree to any arrangement that didn't preserve the status quo between India and Tibet and that India would maintain direct contacts. They also stated their recognition of Chinese suzerainty was conditional on China accepting Tibetan autonomy.
A significant point of analysis in the book, highlighted by the excerpts, is the confusion and casualness in India's approach, particularly concerning the terms "sovereignty" and "suzerainty" in relation to Tibet. When China threatened Tibet, India initially used the term "sovereignty" in a note to Beijing in August 1950, causing China to express surprise at India attempting to influence its sovereign rights in Tibet. Delhi later acknowledged this as an "oversight". Nehru himself described the difference between sovereignty and suzerainty as "rather academic" in November 1950, even suggesting "autonomy plus sovereignty leads to suzerainty". However, at the time of the Tibetan revolt in 1959, Nehru stated at a press conference that "suzerainty is obviously less than sovereignty". Bhasin notes that it was unlikely Ambassador Panikkar changed "suzerainty" to "sovereignty" in the August 1950 note, as ambassadors typically cannot alter such communications from headquarters without instructions. He suggests it was either a contradiction, loose language by the ministry, or a lack of clear understanding, indicating India's "casual approach to important issues". This was not an isolated incident, as a similar clarification was needed in January 1949 regarding a statement on upholding Tibetan independence "subject to the suzerainty of China". India's willingness to recognize suzerainty was conditioned on Chinese recognition of Tibetan autonomy and agreement on the frontier, but this was only clarified later. Bhasin argues that in diplomacy, where nuances and semantics are critical, India continued to make vague pronouncements. The use of "sovereignty" by Nehru in a note meant only for Panikkar also perpetuated this confusion, as bureaucracy tends to follow the leader's language. Even the Indian Foreign Secretary used the term "sovereignty" in a discussion with the Chinese ambassador in November 1950, arguing that Indian establishments in Tibet did not violate Chinese sovereignty and required mutual consent for modification.
India's reaction to the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 is described through various diplomatic exchanges. Delhi initially advised the Tibetan delegation, which was preparing to go to Beijing, to stop their journey after China launched its attack, believing discussions would not be free from pressure. Lhasa agreed. India drafted a strongly worded note accusing China of "acting with certain amount of deceit" and dismissing China's security fears in Tibet. US Ambassador Henderson discussed American willingness to help, but Nehru, though disappointed, insisted on maintaining friendly relations with China, seeing it as essential for peace in Asia and the world. Nehru did not consider it wise to deepen any wedge between India and China and told Henderson that the US could be most helpful by "doing nothing". Nehru seemed aware of American intentions to use the situation to open a front against China to relieve pressure in Korea. Despite his disappointment, Nehru stuck to his belief that the Himalayas were impenetrable and the developments in Tibet posed "no particular danger" to India.
The book covers the signing of the 17-Point Agreement between Tibet and China in 1951. The Tibetan delegates signed this agreement under significant pressure, being told that if they disagreed, Tibet would be "liberated peacefully or by force". Lhasa was shocked by the agreement, which compromised Tibet's independent status and allowed Chinese troops, believing their delegate might have signed under duress. The terms offered were similar to those after the Chinese took Chamdo, a key town. The Indian embassy assessed that the agreement placed Tibet in a better position than Inner Mongolia and guaranteed the position of the Dalai Lama and the Buddhist church, but noted the potential for Chinese intervention in case of conflict between the Dalai and Panchen Lamas. Nehru's initial public comments on the agreement were vague, suggesting he was aware but lacked full details, while also mentioning Chinese suzerainty and Tibetan autonomy, along with India's interests.
The 1954 India-China agreement on Tibet is presented as India's attempt to discard the "inconvenient legacy of the British". China ensured negotiations were based on reciprocity. Old practices, like Indian hospitals serving locals or direct Indian official access to Tibetan officials, were restricted or required Chinese permission. China also insisted on non-discrimination between ethnic Tibetans and Han Chinese traders, eventually leading to wording that accommodated both. Nehru presented the agreement positively in Parliament, highlighting the five principles of Panchsheel in the preamble, despite the hurdles and concessions India made. The details of the negotiations and India's "climbdowns" were not fully disclosed to the public. The press, with limited information, generally welcomed it, with some erroneously believing India had secured approval of the McMahon Line. Bhasin argues that Nehru had already decided to surrender the unilateral facilities India enjoyed in Tibet. Crucially, China's "reservations on Ladakh remained under a tight lid then and thereafter". The Intelligence Bureau was reportedly "disturbed" by the 1954 agreement, feeling it favoured China against India's interests, though the credibility of this assessment, published after Nehru's death, is questioned by the author.
The Revolt in Tibet in 1959 and the Dalai Lama's flight to India are major events covered. Bhasin describes the revolt as a "national uprising" against Chinese rule, which was suppressed by force. The Chinese presence, particularly the PLA in Lhasa, was daunting for Tibetans. Contrary to the 17-Point Agreement, the Chinese were seen as attacking Tibetan religion and culture and undermining the Dalai Lama's authority. A report by Political Officer Apa Pant in 1957 noted that despite Chinese efforts to win over Tibetans with infrastructure and indoctrination, they had failed to gain affection or friendship. Pant warned that if Tibet became a communist country guided by China, it would exert pressure on India's frontiers, potentially claiming areas like Bhutan, Sikkim, parts of NEFA, Darjeeling, Kalimpong, and Ladakh in the future. Nehru, however, was not impressed by Pant's report, deeming it lacking perspective and objectivity, and restricted its circulation.
China blamed the revolt on "imperialists and foreign reactionary elements," often code words for the US, Taiwan, and India. China accused them of using Kalimpong in India as a base for anti-Chinese activities. When the Dalai Lama sought asylum, India provided it, assuring him of every facility and traditional respect. China warned India to keep its hands off Tibet. India managed the Dalai Lama's arrival and public statements carefully, advising him to be brief initially and avoid controversial remarks that could embarrass him or India. Nehru himself advised the Dalai Lama to reflect before making a longer statement. A draft communiqué from the Tibetans claimed Tibetan independence and sought recognition for a new government, but the Indian Foreign Secretary felt it was not suitable. Delhi stressed the need for the Dalai Lama to clarify he left Tibet "of his own free will and not under duress," which the Chinese were questioning. India reiterated that it would not recognize any Tibetan Government in India and would not permit hostile propaganda against any friendly country. While Nehru maintained a moderate and courteous tone towards China despite provocations, the Chinese official press launched "virulent attacks" and used "undignified language" against India and Nehru personally. They accused Nehru of not understanding Tibetan society and representing Indian "big bourgeoisie and big landlords" allied with the British. They also alleged India did not want China to become strong.
The border issue is a critical component of the book's analysis. Bhasin notes that the Sikkim-Tibet boundary, delimited in 1896, was the "only boundary along the entire frontier which was properly delimited". The McMahon Line, fixing the border between India and Tibet in the eastern sector, was part of the 1914 Simla Convention, which China objected to. The western border, particularly Aksai Chin, was not properly delimited. India's stance, largely articulated by Nehru, was that its frontiers were well-defined and recognized by long custom and usage and were not open for discussion. China, however, viewed the frontier as a "British creation". Bhasin highlights the construction of the Sinkiang–Tibet Highway through Aksai Chin by China, completed by 1957. India's reaction was an "Informal" protest, described as naive, as it simultaneously asked China for help locating missing Indian personnel in the area it claimed as its own. China, in turn, announced it had arrested armed Indians conducting "unlawful surveys" in Chinese territory. Bhasin suggests that Nehru was likely aware of the road's construction but chose to "play it down". There are even claims that Indian military intelligence was instructed by Nehru not to gather information on the Chinese presence across the Tibetan border.
The Nehru-Zhou Summit in April 1960 took place against a backdrop of heightened tension following the Kongka Pass incident in the western sector, where Indian policemen were killed. This incident and the resulting public outcry in India "shrank Nehru's space for any compromise". The summit ended in a stalemate, with both sides reiterating their positions. The joint communiqué acknowledged a greater understanding but little substantive progress. Zhou Enlai, at a press conference, hinted at future visits but also subtly warned Indian journalists about how his statements would be reported in China. Some analyses, cited by Bhasin, suggest that in these talks, only China appeared serious about making concessions, while India's pre-determined attitude left no room for adjustment.
The period leading up to and including the 1962 war is discussed. Tensions escalated, notably after an incident in the Chip Chap Valley. While both sides blamed each other for incidents, China expressed willingness for talks without preconditions, but India insisted on an "appropriate climate," requiring China to vacate areas occupied since 1957. Nehru publicly stated India's decision to evict the Chinese, which some deemed imprudent given the high tensions. China's attack in 1962 is framed by Bhasin, citing Chinese sources, as not solely about territory but aimed at "demolish[ing] India's arrogance and illusion of grandeur" and asserting China's strength. Nehru viewed it as "Chinese expansionism supported... by Communist ideas". The war significantly impacted the Indian public, who, having been told of India-China friendship, felt a sense of "betrayal". This sense of betrayal has lingered and made resolving the border problem difficult since, making India "prisoners of the past". The war also affected Nehru's image, bringing him under attack for keeping the nation in the dark. Despite pressures, Nehru remained committed to his policy of non-alignment, seeing it as vital for world peace, while insisting India would resist aggression and would not negotiate on the basis of Chinese territorial claims.
Bhasin's book emphasizes the lack of historical perspective in the Indian understanding of China's culture and ways of thinking, suggesting this contributed to the "humiliating defeat" in 1962. He argues that a rational solution to the border problem is difficult because the public believes China was entirely perfidious, and the past Indian position is seen as non-negotiable. To move forward, Bhasin suggests convincing the public that the past Indian position wasn't entirely rational and that China wasn't altogether perfidious. He strongly advocates for opening the Ministry of External Affairs archives in their entirety to allow the public to see the correct position for themselves, noting that archives remain inaccessible despite rules, impeding the writing of history.
In conclusion, A. S. Bhasin's "Nehru, Tibet and China" is presented as a meticulously researched and insightful analysis of a critical period in India-China relations, viewed through the lens of Nehru's foreign policy and the pivotal role of Tibet. Drawing on vast archival resources, the book challenges established narratives and reveals the complexities, confusions, and strategic choices that shaped events leading up to the 1962 conflict. It details the shifts in China's attitude, India's sometimes inconsistent or naive diplomatic approach, the tragic situation in Tibet under Chinese occupation, the sensitive issue of the Dalai Lama's asylum, and the intractable border dispute. The book positions Nehru's "fatal attraction" for China and the impact of Indian domestic politics as key factors influencing the unfolding events. By highlighting the historical record, particularly the documentary evidence, Bhasin aims to clarify the facts for a wider audience and stimulate a more informed understanding of India's relationship with China, including the challenges that persist today. The advance praise underscores its value as a significant contribution to the study of India's foreign policy and a timely read in the context of current India-China relations. The author's call for greater transparency through opening the archives underscores his commitment to historical accuracy and public understanding. Based on the sources, this book appears to be an important, detailed, and critical examination of a pivotal chapter in India's history.
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